Perhaps the most powerful form of framing arises through reference dependence, wherein choices are made recognizing the starting point or a goal. In labor economics, for example, a form of reference dependence, income targeting, has been argued to represent a serious challenge to traditional economic models. We design a field experiment linked tightly to three popular economic models of labor supply-two behavioral variants and one simple neoclassical model-to deepen our understanding of the positive implications of our major theories. Consistent with neoclassical theory and reference-dependent preferences with endogenous reference points, workers (vendors in open air markets) supply more hours when presented with an expected transitory increase in hourly wages. In contrast with the prediction of behavioral models, however, when vendors earn an unexpected windfall early in the day, their labor supply does not respond. A key feature of our market in terms of parsing the theories is that vendors do not post prices rather they haggle with customers. In this way, our data also speak to the possibility of reference-dependent preferences over other dimensions. Our investigation again yields results that are in line with neoclassical theory, as bargaining patterns are unaffected by the unexpected windfall.
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Several fundamental postulates give rise to the predictions from neoclassical models. One of the most basic tenets-the basic independence assumption-has recently come under heavy scrutiny. Results across several experimental settings suggest that preferences are not independent of current entitlements (see, e.g., Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1991; Englemann and Hollard, 2010) . The most accepted theory explaining such preferences invokes psychological effects, and is broadly termed "prospect theory" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . Recent studies have shown the power of using such behavioral insights-from motivating workers in manufacturing plants to convincing teachers and students to exert more effort, incentive schemes have been used to leverage such preferences (see Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012; Levitt et al., 2012) .
In a normative sense, such preferences call into question commonly held interpretations of indifference curves and cripple applied welfare analysis. For instance, cost/benefit analysis and damage resolution would need a new architecture without the basic independence assumption. From a positive perspective, a large disparity between Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating surplus essentially renders the invariance result of Coase invalid and calls into question how we calculate gains and losses of public policies, ranging from computing the correct gains to trade and who is affected by welfare and transfer programs.
A prime example of the interplay between prospect theory and positive economics is how to grapple with some of the key questions we face in labor economics. For example, how does labor supply respond to changes in taxes, welfare, and transfer programs? How important is inter-temporal substitution? Traditionally, when computing the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES), scholars make use of synthetic cohorts or panels from large survey datasets and employ various regression models. A typical finding in this literature is an estimate of the IES between 0 and 0.4 suggesting a small labor supply response to changing the transitory returns to supplying labor (Ghez and Becker (1975) , MaCurdy (1981) , and Altonji (1986) ). A potential concern with these methods is that the typical worker is not free to vary labor supply and hence the estimates are attenuated from the true, structural and policy-relevant, parameter of interest (Chetty et al. (2011) ). 1 4 clear set of predictions for labor supply in response to expected and unexpected changes in income. 3 In the first empirical test of KR in the context of labor supply decisions, Crawford and Meng (2011) reanalyze the naturally occurring data from Farber (2005 Farber ( , 2008 to test a model where cab drivers target both daily income and hours worked via rational expectations. They find that KR explains labor supply behavior well, whereas a neoclassical model has difficulties. 4 This represented an important contribution, in that it showcases that in a naturally-occurring economic environment an important behavioral model can capture the essence of the labor supply decision.
Since currently the dominant paradigm underlying policy estimates is the neoclassical variant, such a result highlights that with reference dependent preferences the usual elasticity estimates can be severely biased.
We complement this research by extending it in several dimensions. We begin by formalizing three major theories of labor supply-two behavioral and their neoclassical counterpart.
Through the lens of the models, one can see that the previous empirical work using naturallyoccurring data relies on an identification strategy that requires strong assumptions. For instance, in the cab literature, identification is not possible without assumptions on the determinants of driver expectations. We demonstrate the importance of this assumption in the cab literature by investigating the sensitivity of key parameters in Crawford and Meng to perturbations in expectations and realized earnings. This exercise, proposed in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2014) , allows us to explore the relative importance of identifying assumptions for parameter estimates. 3 In particular, an increase in expected wages on a given day should increase labor supply (consistent with the findings of Oettinger (1999) , Fehr and Goette (2007) , Goldberg (2014) ), and an unexpected increase in wages should decrease labor supplied (consistent with the findings of Camerer et al. (1997) , Chou (2002) , and Goette et al. (2004) ). 4 There is also increasing evidence of expectation based reference points explaining other types of behavior in naturally occurring data. Pope and Schweitzer (2011) find that professional golfers behave consistent with KR's predictions: They make a higher percentage of putts when a miss would put them in the losses domain when the reference point is a function of the average score on a whole (as opposed to par). In a similar vein, using expectations of a win from gambling markets, Card and Dahl (2011) find that when a football team has an unexpected loss it explains violent behavior well. In the lab, Abeler et al. (2011) test KR in a real effort task. The lab lends itself well to exogenously varying expectations and Abeler et al. (2011) find that reference points, generated via rational expectations, influence effort provision as predicted by KR.
Our findings induce us to design a field experiment that is tightly linked to the theory, where the exogeneity is achieved by design rather than assumption.
We visit a well-functioning market in India and use a field experiment to construct a panel dataset of labor supply for 335 vendors that are free to choose their hours of work. We randomly assign vendors to receive large shocks to their earnings in order to test explicitly the conflicting predictions of a KR, an income targeting, and a neoclassical model of labor supply. Our sample allows us to generate data that speaks directly to the earlier literature that utilized naturally occurring data while enjoying a level of control on the exogenous shocks that allows us to speak clearly to the theory. In doing so, this study provides a framework to isolate the impact of expected and unexpected changes in daily income on labor supply over both the hours and effort dimensions by simply varying the timing of information available to vendors.
We show that expected increases in wages lead to modest, but statistically significant increases in hours worked, with an implied labor supply elasticity between 0.01 and 0.03. We also show that when vendors are shocked with an unexpected windfall their hours of labor supply do not respond: vendors who receive an unexpected windfall work a similar number of hours as control vendors, and their probability of quitting as the day progresses is also indistinguishable from the behavior of control vendors. Furthermore, as prices are determined by haggling, the bargaining data allows us to compare vendor effort between control and treatment and before and after treatment. Across all comparisons, treatment and control vendors are statistically indistinguishable. In sum, the evidence suggests that a simple neoclassical model of labor supply captures the behavior of vendors in our market.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section II reviews the theoretical content of the competing models of labor supply. Section III links the theory to the experimental design.
Section IV summarizes the evidence generated by our field experiment, first reviewing the behavioral response to an expected wage increase and then analyzing the response to an unexpected wage increase. Section V concludes with a brief discussion.
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II. Theory
To motivate our experimental design we present a discussion of the labor and effort supply decisions for vendors in our sample. The decision problem for vendors each day is to choose their hours of labor supply, ℎ, 5 according to that day's marginal return to labor supplied, !, which we can think of as the vendor's hourly wage. Wages change day-to-day with vendor's learning a day's wage rate when they wake up in the morning. Vendor total income endowment, !, is also affected by unanticipated changes to their endowment, ! ! , that are uncorrelated with !, like a large overpayment from a customer or a loss due to a theft, giving us ! = !ℎ + ! ! .
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With this framework established, we examine predictions of three models of labor supply. First, we discuss a simple neoclassical labor supply model and characterize the response of labor supply to anticipated changes in wages and to an unanticipated income shock. Next we consider the same comparative statics in a model where workers bracket their utility on a day-by-day basis with gain-loss utility over daily earnings in relation to an exogenously determined reference point-we refer to this model as an income targeting model as it is motivated by the informal model of Camerer et al. (1997) . Last, we treat reference points as endogenous distributions of rational expectations for hours and income as presented in KR.
Neoclassical labor supply:
Consider the preferences of a neoclassical vendor on a given day, !, whose utility is additively separable into utility !(•) from earnings, income ! and !(•) from hours worked ℎ. The neoclassical vendor chooses ℎ according to:
where !(•) is increasing and concave and !(•) increasing and convex. Totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to ! and re-arranging yields the following comparative static:
This condition conveys the mathematical content behind the belief that labor supply curves slope upwards in response to transitory changes in wages. In particular, provided vendors have sufficient expected discounted lifetime earnings (! ! ), ! ⋅ shouldn't display much curvature at ! and the inequality should hold.
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The same procedure for a change in savings yields:
which will be ≈ 0 for ! ⋅ without dramatic curvature locally. Again, this captures the sense in which a vendor that receives a shock to non-wage income will only change their behavior through a wealth effect, which ought to be small over small changes in lifetime income. These comparative static predictions are summarized in the first row of table 1.
Income targeting labor supply:
Under the informal framework suggested by Camerer et al. (1997) 8 vendors choose hours worked in order to maximize a functional form along the lines of:
where ! ! is an exogenous daily income utility target and ! > 1 captures the aversion vendors have towards failing to meet their daily target. Income targeting vendors who are below their daily target earn !" from each hour they work. 9 Then, when a vendor crosses their daily target, the returns to an hour of work drops to !, which captures the sense in which income targeting vendors will work more on days when their wage is low and less when their wage is high (!ℎ !" < 0). In an income-targeting model an income shock impacts hours worked by moving 7 This condition is not an artifact of our static modeling of the decision problem. A similar restriction emerges in a dynamic model. 8 We follow the model suggested by Camerer et al. (1997, pp. 425-426) : "One possible explanation for the negative hours elasticities is that cabdrivers take a one-day horizon, and set a target (or a target range) and quit when the target is reached. This decision rule can be modeled by a marginal utility of income declining substantially around the average daily income level."
9 To see this, note that for vendors with ! ≤ ! ! , their marginal rate of substitution is equal to !", not !: causing them to work weakly fewer hours at a given wage rate than they would if they had not earned the overpayment.
To explore these comparative statics further, we suppose a vendor wakes up on a given day and observes a wage of ! ! . If there is no overpayment, then the vendor will supply labor along the associated supply curve and choose ℎ(! ! ) for that day. If the wage is increased to ! ! , then the vendor will instead choose ℎ(! ! ) on the same supply curve, where
if the wages place the vendor above and below the day's reference income. To see the comparative static on an overpayment, compare the supply of labor within a wage, ! ! , when there is no overpayment, which is ℎ(! ! ), to the supply of labor when there is an overpayment, which is ℎ(! ! ). As the figure shows, provided the vendor is in the income-loss domain,
, the negative relationship between hours worked and an overpayment in an income-targeting model arises.
Labor supply in KR:
The KR model has reference points generated via rational expectations of daily income and hours worked. 11 Thus, if a change to wages is expected, vendors will adjust their reference points and labor supply will behave according to the neoclassical model's 10 In particular, we assume the following preference parameterization:
the following choices of parameter values: ! = 0.01, ! ! = 10,000, ! = 0.005, ! = 0.3,!and ! = 3 with ! ! = 100. The income shock is 500. For the region where vendors are above target income if maximizing their loss utility and below the target income if maximizing their gains utility we set hours according to gains utility. 9 predictions. However, when unexpected changes occur within-day, reference points are not updated and gain-loss utility augments the vendors maximization problem.
More formally, the KR vendor maximize an augmented version of (2) where vendors now assign probabilistic beliefs to every possible outcome, ex-ante, creating a reference lottery. 12 Under this specification, gain-loss utility arises from a vendor's comparison of a day's outcome in relation to her distribution of weighted reference points, weighing losses more heavily than gains, the intuition being that for a given realized daily income, !, vendors will feel a mixture of gains and losses in relation to all the incomes they were expecting, weighted by the probability with which they were expecting each possible day's income:
where!! > 1 is the weight of losses 13 and !(•) and !(•) are cumulative distribution functions that capture the probabilistic beliefs of daily income (the random variable, ! ! ) and labor supplied (! ! ), respectively. A KR vendor chooses ℎ to maximize (2), yielding two distinct predictions.
Unlike an income targeting model, KR predicts positive labor supply elasticities in response to expected changes in wages, !, !ℎ !" > 0, but with respect to an unpredicted shock to income, ! ! , KR predicts a negative elasticity, !ℎ !! ! < 0. To see the importance of expectations in KR, we consider a vendor on day ! that chooses labor along !" and is informed that they will earn a supplemental wage on days ! + 1 and ! + 2 for every hour they work. This intervention changes !, wages, and shifts !" up to !" for days ! + 1 and ! + 2. Because information is revealed about ! on day !, reference points in KR also shift on days ! + 1 and ! + 2 from ! ! and ! ! , up to ! ! ′ and ! ! ′, leading to a prediction consistent 11 with the neoclassical prediction of an upward sloping labor supply for KR. A vendor that generates references points via lagged earnings, on the other hand, would not move from ! ! and ! ! !to ! ! ′ and ! ! ′ and labor supply would be negative in response to the perfectly expected increase in wages.
When no information is given prior to a random shock of a day's income, !, reference points will not be able to shift and gain-loss domains will play an important role in both KR and an income targeting model. Consider again the vendor that accrues hours worked and income along line !".
At the start of the day, this vendor's gain-loss utility is mostly in hours-gains/income-losses so the marginal cost of each hour worked is cheap compared to the marginal utility gained from escaping the feeling of income losses. Line !" passes right through the intersection of ! ! and ! ! but consider an unexpected deviation from !" at point ! where a vendor earns a windfall of ! pushing them up to point!!. 17 As the vendor continues to work after the windfall, they now move along line !" where gain-loss utility from income is no longer heavily weighted because the vendor is well beyond ! ! . But as the hours accrue and the vendor gets closer and closer to ! ! , the weight of hours-losses starts to mount, motivating the vendor to quit early. This can be gleaned by considering the vendor still on !" whose disutility from approaching ! ! is counteracted by the utility from increased earnings and approaching ! ! . This yields a negative within-day elasticity with respect to unexpected changes in income.
Expectations and identification in past studies: One of the key results in Crawford and Meng is
the relationship between a driver's likelihood of quitting after a given fare, 18 cumulative hours worked, cumulative earnings, and gain/loss status. In particular, on days that a driver's wage is above expectations, cumulative hours worked is an important predictor of quitting for the day.
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However when drivers observe a wage below their expectations, the opposite is observed.
Cumulative income instead of hours worked predicts that a driver will quit. As Crawford and
12
Meng explain, "Such a reversal is inconsistent with a neoclassical model, in which the targets are irrelevant; but it is gracefully explained by a reference-dependent model."
Crawford and Meng use lagged average earnings and hours worked for each driver/day-of-week combination. They concede that this proxy is noisy but find that their results are "robust to variations in the specification of the targets." The stability of their results to alternative definitions of expectations is key because it suggests that their reported labor supply dynamics are not driven by their simple approximation of the data generating process for expectations.
As an alternative to their robustness exercise we calculate the (local) sensitivity of key parameters in Crawford and Meng 20 to the assumption that (i) lagged earnings measure expectations and (ii) first hour earnings measure realized earnings. This exercise, proposed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2014) , allows us to compare the sensitivity of parameters with respect to these two assumptions (holding all else equal). This exercise is informative because (ii) is an administrative measure of earnings. That is, parameters ought be sensitive to perturbations to (ii), whereas Crawford and Meng present suggestive evidence that their estimates are robust to perturbations to (i).
Figure 3 presents results from our analysis, with each plotted value representing the expected change in the marginal effect in response to a standard deviation change in expected or realized earnings holding all else equal. 21 The top frame of Figure 3 shows that when drivers are in the gains domain, identification is sensitive to both assumptions with the marginal effect responding slightly more to perturbations in first hour earnings than expectations. This trend reverses in the bottom frame. When drivers are in the losses domain the marginal effect on quitting with respect to changes in cumulative total hours worked and income is more sensitive to changes in expected earnings than realized earnings.
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Put differently, consider the following question: To what extent is the assumption that lagged earnings measures driver expectations affecting estimates in Crawford and Meng? Figure 3 shows us that key parameters depend as much or more on assumption (i) as they do on assumption (ii). That is, while the reversal described by Crawford and Meng are robust to specific changes in the specification of expectations, a more formal investigation reveals that key parameters are quite sensitive to misspecification of expected earnings.
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Alternative dimensions of labor supply: In Figure 2 , one of the key requirements for the predictions of KR is that after the overpayment at !, the slope of !" is equal to the slope of !".
If workers expected their wage to increase after the overpayment then the slope of !" would be steeper and the change in the gain-loss utility from the overpayment (the second and third lines of equation (2)) could be counteracted by the neoclassical component of utility in KR (the first line in equation (2)). One way around this difficulty is to design an overpayment that is orthogonal to future earnings that day. Another would be to explore an alternative dimension of labor supply that does not rely on intuiting the worker's expectations about future wages.
We present a model of effort provision for a worker at a single-worker firm who collects a portion of their firm's profits and where the production function for that firm is only a function of bargaining effort. 23 Using a simple theory of the firm suggests that worker effort can be directly observed in our setting. To see this, we start with the typical equilibrium condition for wages at a firm:
where the marginal product of labor is simply the first derivative of the firm's production function, !(!), where ! ⋅ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in effort, !. As a result, (3) simplifies to:
22 We only conduct a sensitivity analysis on Table 2 but extending this to Crawford and Meng's structural model would be straightforward. Difficulties in estimating their structural model cause us to focus our efforts on Table 2 . 23 At this point we are introducing a feature of the market that we later study. Some other industries, such as taxi cab drivers, do not have a similar margin for effort that is easily detectable in the same way.
14 where ! is the fraction of profits the worker takes home in wages from transaction ! when the worker exerts effort level ! ! . The profits from transaction ! are simply the difference in price that results from bargaining and the per-unit cost of the good being sold. Thus, a simple theory of the firm tells us exactly how to identify effort in a market with single-worker firms and no posted prices-just observe the final negotiated price. That is:
By observing ! ! we can observe effort for a given transaction.
But how do the three models discussed above deal with quality of labor supply (effort), as opposed to quantity (hours worked)? Conceptually, the three models work identically to the description above. 24 A neoclassical model has a worker that wakes up each morning and observes the returns to effort on that day, chooses an aggregate level of effort to provide on that day, and then smooths the effort supplied over all the transactions that occur over the course of the day. The neoclassical model therefore predicts no change in effort supplied in response to an overpayment. 25 The two behavioral models, on the other hand, predict reduced effort in response to an overpayment.
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In summary, the three major models of labor supply yield differing sets of predictions in response to expected and unexpected changes in wages and earnings, as summarized in Table 1 .
Neoclassical theory and KR predicts increasing labor supply to increases in expected wages, while an income-targeting model would predict decreasing. With respect to unexpected changes in earnings, neoclassical theory predicts no change in labor supply or effort provision but KR and a status quo model predict negative supply elasticities for both quantity and quality of labor.
24 KR also suggests that effort and hours worked are interchangeable in their model of labor supply. 25 A condition that is easy to satisfy provided the overpayment occurs without any bargaining by the customer.
26 Note that we are modeling the quantity of labor supplied as fixed and the effort provided in those hours as the relevant margin (see also Abeler et al. (2011) ). A joint model would be less tractable and proves unnecessary to interpret the data from our field experiment.
III. From Theory to Experimental Design
To test the central predictions of these three theories of labor supply we conduct Only single-vendor shops that sold non-perishables were selected for observation, as vendors that sold perishables would face a different maximization problem than discussed above.
The market opens at sunrise, which was 8:00am during Session 1 and 6:00am during Session 2,
and it closes at sunset, around 9:00pm. While these constraints place a ceiling on hours of labor supplied, actual hours are well below the ceiling, giving us a generous margin to examine changes in labor supplied. Also, importantly, vendors in Shillong are not trading their time between multiple labor markets, such as agricultural work, allowing us to confidently call the hours worked we observe, each worker's total hours of labor supplied that day.
We conduct two separate experiments in the market; (i) The Market Survey experiment, where we vary expected wages for vendors and observe labor supply, (ii) The Betel Nut Experiment where we observe labor supply as well as bargaining effort after an unexpected earnings shock. Table 2 summarizes several key variables of vendors in our two experiments. In particular, the data confirm that vendors in both experiments set their own hours, as within-vendor variance is nearly as high as between-vendor variance in both experiments.
In the Market Survey Experiment we highlight the various margins of hours of labor supply for our sample. In particular, vendors are free to participate in supplying labor on any given day, with 98% of the vendor days supplying some labor. Also, vendors showed up to the market between 9:00 am and 10:00 am and left between 6:00 pm and 7:00 pm, with a small percentage taking breaks during the day. 27 These four margins and the substantial within-vendor variance for each outcome highlight the numerous ways that vendors can take on extra hours of labor each day if offered an expected transitory increase in wages.
In the Betel Nut Experiment we observe both hours of labor supplied as well as bargaining effort. To quantify bargaining effort, we send local confederates to vendors to negotiate for a uniform good sold by all vendors-betel nuts of two varieties. It is critical to our identification strategy that vendors actually vary prices and the second half of Table 2 confirms our claim that vendors do not use posted prices. In the bargaining task we observe the vendor's initial offer and final price (in INR). Again, there is both within-and between-vendor variance over these outcomes, suggesting that vendors are free to shirk if they pass their daily income-target early in the day but high adjustment costs could cause them to supply their typical number of hours worked.
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To observe hours of labor supply and effort in bargaining we hired twenty-two local agents over the two periods. Before the experiment, an extensive mapping of the market was conducted and each shop was carefully marked out. All agents were carefully trained in identifying the shops such that purchases and hours worked could be cleanly observed. Figure 4 summarizes the dates of each experiment, the number of vendors in each cell, the number of days of observation, the dynamics of treatment assignment, and the size of the treatment incentives compared to approximate control market earnings. We discuss the details of treatment for each experiment separately below. Under the control header is also the approximate hourly wage of a vendor based on our discussions with locals-INR 10. The unit of randomization differed between sessions of the Market Survey Experiment. In Session 1, six clusters of vendors were identified and then each cluster had a treatment assignment. Then, within each cluster, vendors were randomized into treatment (the level of which was constant within cluster) or control. Treatment vendors were then randomized into a two-day period that the treatment would occur. In Session 2 eight clusters of vendors were identified. Then four of those clusters had treatment (which was constant in level again) and control status randomized; however the days of the treatment were constant within cluster. The other four clusters in Session 2 were assigned to be either all treatment or control, with treatment level also constant within cluster.
Treatments in the Market
Treatment in the Betel Nut Experiment:
In the second experiment we shock vendors with an unexpected overpayment for a good, allowing us to cleanly transfer an overprize, !, early in the day. In response to the overprize we observe both hours of labor supplied and vendor bargaining effort for treatment and control. The experiment was run over 3 days according to the following timeline: On day ! we only observed bargaining behavior across different vendors, on ! + 1 a random sample of vendors were selected to receive approximately a week of profit (INR 500) from a westerner. This transfer happens through the purchase of betel nuts, a mild narcotic, and a huge overprize is made to the shopkeeper without any bargaining by the westerner. After quickly delivering the shock to each vendor, the westerner leaves the market immediately. In the time 29 Two vendors in session 1 declined participation in the INR 10 treatment. We omit these vendors from our sample.
18 spent in this market, western tourists were spotted occasionally, but only rarely, making an overpayment by a westerner the ideal method of transferring an overprize, as it is unlikely to convey information on future wages or bargaining effort that day. On day ! + 1 and ! + 2 we observe bargaining effort again, as well as hours of labor supplied.
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The commodity chosen was betel nuts, since this was a commonly found non-perishable good, allowing us to locate scores of different vendors. Our confederates were instructed to bargain at pre-selected shops that were carefully mapped out. Over the three days, both treated and untreated shops were approached several times by different agents. Each time a fixed amount of betel nuts were purchased and bargaining behavior was recorded. Two types of betel nuts are sold in the market, one type having been suspended in water for about a month. The agents were instructed to purchase 20 betel nuts on each purchase. The average price elicited beforehand was approximately 20 Rupees so agents were given 30 Rupees for each purchase. Any money retained after the purchase was the agent's to keep -bargaining was therefore incentivized for our confederates (List, 2004) . For each purchase we registered: Initial offer by the vendor, final price agreed upon, time taken on bargaining, and the type of betel nut. Figure 4 summarizes the details of this experiment. We note that the typical daily earnings of a vendor tend to be around INR 80, a total of 85 vendors were randomized into treatment or control, and the hours of labor supply was observed for two days while bargaining was observed for all three. Figure 5 shows a time series of unconditional average hours worked in the Market Survey Experiment, which we discuss now to motivate our identification strategy was applied on that day and whether it was the first or second day of treatment, with a 1 denoting the first day of treatment and a 2 denoting the second day of treatment.
IV. Experimental Results
Market Survey Experiment:
Figure 5 allows us to compare the impact of treatment status on labor supplied both within treatment arms and between treatment and control. Immediately a number of trends jump out from Session 1. In particular, consistent with both KR and neoclassical theory, treatment status appears to lead to increases of between 0.2 to 0.6 hours of labor supplied, with the biggest increases on the second day of treatment status. This observation is independent of any possible day fixed effect for Session 1, as we randomize the start of treatment in Session 1 and both waves of treatment see an increase in labor supplied on the second day of treatment status. While treatment vendors were told at the end of day ! that their wages would be increased on days ! + 1 and ! + 2, the supplemental wage may not have been entirely credible until the end of the day ! + 1 when vendors were actually paid for the first time by our agents. Thus, the time-series suggests that the purest test of the impact on hours worked of an expected increase in wages would be a comparison of pre-treatment hours worked to hours worked in day!! + 2.
Figure 5 also shows that, in general, hours of labor supplied decreased for vendors after treatment status, especially in Session 1. This is consistent with vendors trading current work for future leisure on treatment days, but to fully test this prediction would require observing vendors over a longer time-span so we focus on the comparison of pre-treatment hours of labor supplied to labor supplied on day ! + 2 because using post-treatment variation in hours worked would fail the strict exogeneity assumption of any panel regression model.
One other feature of the data that Figure 5 highlights is the increased variability in hours worked in Session 2. Recalling Table 3 , Session 2 featured a larger number of vendors over a shorter period of time than Session 1. Furthermore, the variability of hours worked by geographic cluster was greater in Session 2, making inference from a comparison of means in Figure 5 difficult.
Nonetheless, Figure 5 does show that the increase in labor supplied on day ! + 2 for treatment vendors holds for all treatments but INR 10 in Session 2.
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To more precisely test the predictions of the three theories, we estimate the following linear model:
Where ! !"# represents the quantity of labor supplied by vendor ! in cluster ! on day !. ! is a vector with dummies for the three levels of treatment status and control. ! is a vector with our coefficients of interest. Augmenting the analysis we also include fixed effects for cluster (! ! ).
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Furthermore, we estimate (5) over two samples. In column (1) we use both days of treatment. In column (2) estimates are over just Day 2 of treatment. The robust standard errors reported in Table 3 are clustered at the lowest level of randomization for a geographic cluster of vendors. Table 3 shows that across both specifications the coefficient for INR 60 is significant at traditional levels with the inclusion of day 1 of treatment substantially attenuating the estimate. While our estimates are statistically significant, economically they are quite small. A back of the envelope calculation of the implied elasticity suggests an intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply between 0.01 to 0.03 for our sample. 32 To place this elasticity in relation to other estimates we briefly review estimates of this parameter. Card (1994, pp. 63) 
notes that, "[t]aken
31 Estimation with vendor specific fixed effects does not change the analysis. Estimation with day*cluster fixed effects is not feasible because their inclusion drops the four clusters that had no variation in treatment and day. 32 As reported in Table 4 , the average hours worked for vendors in control is 8.343 hours and treatment vendors increase their hours worked by 0.6 hours in response to a 600% increase in wages, giving an elasticity of labor supplied of 0.01. The largest elasticity implied by Table 4 is given by the INR 30 treatment in column 2, where wages were increased by 300% and hours worked increased by 0.7 hours, yielding a labor supply elasticity of 0.03.
together, the literature suggests that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is surely no higher than 0.5, and probably no higher than 0.2." Subsequent research has sought to estimate this parameter using quasi-experiments (e.g., Iceland eliminated its income tax in 1987, Bianchi et al. (2001) ), finding elasticities between 0.2 and 0.4 but these elasticities are still an order of magnitude too small to explain the changes in labor supply over the business cycle. Chetty et al. (2011) argues that adjustment costs and employer constraints on changing labor supply attenuates the micro estimates of these elasticities. Fehr and Goette (2007) report evidence consistent with this claim from a field experiment using bike messengers in Zurich with highfrequency data. However, we have argued that our sample faces no such constraints and the labor supply response in our sample is still quite small.
To explore why the response in our sample is so small, Figure later, and taking off the day less often. 34 This leads us to attribute the differences between our findings and recent work to the fact that our estimates are driven off of changes over a very short time-span, even though it is unclear why an intertemporal substitution elasticity ought to be driven by a longer time-span. Furthermore, the magnitude of the transitory increase in wages in our experiment are so large that the returns to supplying more labor ought to overwhelm any possible adjustment costs.
Betel Nut Experiment: Whereas neoclassical theory and KR have identical predictions for the market survey experiment, the Betel Nut experiment pits the two theories against each other.
Neoclassical theory predicts no response to labor supply, while KR predicts that vendors would quit early or supply less effort over the hours of labor they supply. Table 4 Table 4 shows that hours of labor supplied across the two samples are identical. The same trend emerges in the bargaining data, with treatment and control vendors making identical initial offers, agreeing to the same prices, and using similar amounts of time to negotiate. Table 4 reports the total hours worked by treatment and control vendors. In line with neoclassical theory the point estimates are strikingly similar. However, Table 4 does not report one source of variation that we can exploit. In particular, the intervention occurred just after 10:00 am on the day of treatment, but vendors arrived at the market at various times. Thus, as the day progressed, it is possible that the cumulative hours worked by a vendor explains quitting for treatment vendors but not control. To test this we follow Crawford and Meng (2011) and estimate a probit model of the probability that a vendor quits in a given hour separately for treatment and control vendors:
Where vendor ! stops working at ! if ! !" > 0 where ℎ !" measures cumulative hours worked at hour ! for vendor !. Regardless of the model we are testing, cumulative hours worked should be positively related to the probability of quitting, but if the effect of cumulative hours worked weighs more heavily for treatment vendors that passed their income target early in the morning then we would have evidence consistent with KR. Table 5 reports the marginal effects from a probit regression where, following Farber (2005) and Crawford and Meng (2011) we assess the marginal effects at the 8th hour of work. Both estimates in Table 6 suggest that a one hour increase in hours worked corresponds to 30-40
percentage-point increase in the probability of quitting, but consistent with neoclassical theory the effect of cumulative hours worked does not weigh more heavily on treatment vendors than control vendors with the two estimates strikingly similar. Tables 4 and 5 show that an overpayment does not lead to the predicted change in behavior of KR and an income-targeting model of hours of labor supply, however, we've made a strong assumption in our interpretation of the hours worked data from the Betel Nut Experiment. In particular we assumed that a large overpayment early in the day will leave each vendor's expected wages unchanged. KR contends that reference points are fixed at the start of each day but the neoclassical utility component in KR is still free to respond to changes in expected wages. Thus, it's possible that these two components counteract one another and the results presented so far are the sum of these two effects.
However, as we showed in the alternative dimensions discussion in Section 1, effort exerted by vendors can be indirectly observed by final prices bargained in the marketplace and expected returns to effort should be unchanged in response to an instantaneous overpayment in the marketplace.
The bottom rows of Table 4 show that treatment and control vendors were equally effective at bargaining prices suggesting they supplied similar levels of effort in bargaining on the treatment day. Nonetheless, we can exploit the panel structure of the bargaining data to consider the possibility that the sample means in Table 4 are motivated by other sources of variation. Figure 6 presents a time series of mean final price standardized across Betel Nut type and confederate conducting the bargaining for each hour-day over the course of the experiment for treatment and non-treatment vendors. The number next to each dot in Figure 6 shows the quantity of transactions observed in that hour-day combination.
Comparing final price for treatment and non-treatment vendors before and after treatment, no substantial trends emerge. Before the treatment day, prices vary from hour-to-hour between treatment and control vendors but the number of transactions per hour is small and averaged over the entire day there is no significant difference. On treatment day, (2/28), the final price for treatment vendors start out lower (although not lower in a statistically significant sense) than control vendors. However this trend reverses later in the day. No trend emerges from the posttreatment days of observation either.
To more formally rule out the influence of other sources of variation we estimate the following linear model:
Where ! !"# is the final price agreed upon for vendor ! on day ! with experimenter !. We run a number of specifications that include fixed effects for day, ! ! , and vendor, ! ! , in order to test the robustness of treatment, ! !" , on price. Furthermore, we include control variables for the type of betel nut bargained over. Table 6 shows results from estimating (7). Moving from column to column of Table 6 the treatment status coefficient is consistently close to zero suggesting that receiving a large overpayment early in the day does not affect vendor effort in bargaining. In fact, as control variables are added, the sign of treatment actually becomes positive, although not large. Instead of reference points describing vendor effort, it appears that vendors treat the overpayment just as a neoclassical model would predict.
While it may be possible that vendors shirk over other dimensions of their effort, it is unclear how any such dimension could affect the vendor's profits, as we have generated data that speaks both to the effort a vendor spends on bargaining and the number of hours vendors spend performing this task. Previous research on reference points and effort provision in lab experiments (e.g., Abeler et al. (2011) ) has similarly captured the profits to subjects by varying the payoff to quantity and quality of effort. Yet, we find that when such tasks are conducted in the field outside the scrutiny of the lab, there is little advantage of adding gain-loss utility to a simple neoclassical model of labor supply.
V. Concluding Remarks
Understanding the behavioral response to transitory changes in wages is critical for designing policies ranging from taxation, unemployment benefits, and intergenerational transfers programs like Social Security. As a result, a large literature in economics attempts to estimate the magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity substitution for labor supply, the response to transitory (as opposed to permanent) changes in the wage rate. A recent literature in behavioral economics has emerged questioning whether the neoclassical model should be relied on to generate such estimates. In particular, Farber (2008) notes:
Evaluation of much government policy regarding tax and transfer programs depends on having reliable estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to wage rates and income levels. To the extent that individuals' levels of labor supply are the result of optimization with reference dependent preferences, the usual estimates of wage and income elasticities are likely to be misleading.
In this study, we design two field experiments to test the role of reference-dependent preferences in the labor supply decision. We present a several competing models of labor supply and show how an ideal experiment would test the predictions of these competing models. Beyond providing empirical insights, theoretically, the results of such exercises are important, as questions of what models best explain behavior and whether life cycle labor supply models explain business-cycle labor supply behavior remain ill-understood.
We report that expected changes in wages lead to increases in labor supply-a finding consistent with neoclassical models of labor supply and KR but not with an income-targeting model. We then report evidence on the behavioral response to unexpected changes in wages. Consistent with a neoclassical model of labor supply we find that unexpected changes in wages have no impact on hours of labor supply or on effort provided, suggesting that reference utility does not drive behavior of vendors in our study.
Methodologically our study differs substantially from earlier work. By using a field experiment in a naturally-occurring market, we can control changes in earnings and also changes in expected earnings by simply divulging or withholding information. This added control of variation, however, does not come at the expense of using subjects unfamiliar with allocating their labor in the market studied. In particular, vendors mimic the features of those in studies that have used naturally occurring data in the sense that the work of vendors is to efficiently allocate their labor supply in the face of day-to-day changes in earnings.
Overall, we find that the predictions of the neoclassical model speak most clearly to observed behavior. This, of course, does not mean that continued behavioral modeling is fruitless. More work needs to be done to determine if our results are replicable; furthermore, much can be gained by deepening our understanding of the models that can explain behavioral responses to important changes in the economic environment. with the following parameter values: = 0.01, s 0 = 10, 000, = 0.005, ✏ = 0.3, = 3, and yr = 100. When there is an income shock s 0 increases to 10, 500. For KR the baseline wage is drawn from w ⇠ (4, 0.2) and P {Overpayment occurs} = 0.001. For KR with an expected increase in the realized wage is simply,w = w + 10, w ⇠ (4, 0.2). Conceptually, the wage and overpayment is realized as soon as workers show up at the market that day and they pick their hours of labor supply accordingly. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 The Kernel Density plots summarize the distribution of hours worked, start time, and quitting time for vendors in treatment on day 2 and compares to vendors in control that were in the same clusters as treatment vendors. Start and quit time has been normalized to hour 0-the opening time of the market, which varied over the two sessions of the Market Survey Experiment. Hours worked is the total number of hours of labor supplied.
